Sunday, January 24, 2021

Theory Final Exam

Part I

A-B. I keep envisioning myself counseling while playing basketball, shooting hoops in the office parking lot with “troubled” young men. Mostly I ask questions, rebound, and listen. But we also practice becoming aware of our automatic thoughts and feelings when we miss or make, testing alternative or replacement thoughts from time to time. We talk through social skills bounce passing, or we analyze the A-B-C’s of of recurring challenges from home or school or work while shooting free throws. I use corny sports metaphors to frame discussions of goals, relationships, values, or a relevant psychological construct. We take a short break to practice breathing and stillness. Of course the weather is always fair, the ball is always pumped up, the rim is always forgiving, and the clients all love basketball!

Frankly I do not have clear and strong preferences for future counseling settings and clients. I come into this program on the heels of really wonderful experiences in a one year pastoral care program and a two year training program for spiritual directors. In both settings I was constantly amazed by the healing, stabilizing power of a safe, non-judgmental space to share with a caring and attentive listener. When we got to “farmer Carl’s” chapter in this class I said amen with every page. I also come into the program having been a counseling and psychiatric client off and on for 15 years, at first trying to escape from and now trying to make the best of life with recurring depression. At this point, my main goal in pursuing a counseling practice is to pass it on. I want to pass on the encouragement, empathy, and healing tools I have received -- the most important tool being that safe, non-judgmental space and relationship.

I am part of the RSA grant program facilitated by Dr. Wager, so I expect and am excited to head into rehabilitation counseling settings. I would love to work with youth transitioning from school to life after school. I would love to work with prison re-entry or diversion programs. I would love to work with clients with severe mental illness. I would love to work with seniors. I am having a hard time thinking of client populations or settings where I do not want to work, which may show a lack of self-awareness on my part. I am hoping the upcoming intro to rehab counseling class with Dr. Hawley will help me narrow my interests. 

Though my preferences are not clear, I can at least make an educated guess about my future practice and clients. Following through with my RSA grant I will work for a state agency or associated organization, most likely in an outpatient platform, one-on-one or in small groups with people receiving state vocational-rehabilitation services. I will work with a wide variety of clients -- perhaps their families and potential employers, too -- who have a wide variety of functional disabilities. We will collaborate to set goals for living, working, and loving, and we will find ways to pursue those goals. And I hope we get to play some basketball along the way! In all seriousness, I hope to find ways to incorporate therapeutic goals into familiar games or my clients’ favorite activities.

C. For a recent project I read and thoroughly enjoyed Thinking, Fast and Slow, by Daniel Kahneman, so a few of the concepts from that book will pop up in this paper. He introduced me to the “Two Systems Theory” of the mind, where system 1 is a collection of unconscious or not-fully-conscious, automatic, relatively fast cognitive processes, and system 2 is the conscious, reflective, easily-tired activity we usually identify as thinking or reasoning. It seems to be a prevalent theory in various forms. My wife, who is a therapist for children and youth dealing with trauma, uses the metaphor of “upstairs/downstairs brain” to model the mind for kids and their families. The basic activities of survival and life happen downstairs, and the more complicated activities like reasoning and planning happen upstairs. This helps my wife explain ways and times we might get chronically “stuck” downstairs, how to get unstuck, and how to parent kids when they are stuck. I also like Johnathan Haidt’s “elephant and rider” metaphor, where the rider is our conscious reason and the elephant everything else; the elephant is mostly running the show and the rider is there for public relations. 

Potential precursors to this two part theory of mind abound: conscious/unconscious, reason/emotion, spirit/flesh. The old mind/body dualism is now just within the mind itself, a mind/mind dualism. What part of our experience or behavior is not the mind? That is one problem I have with theories of mind I have encountered, generally. They seem to grow and grow, in their efforts to include everything having to do with our neurological system, until they might as well be a theory of human life. Ellis adds the E and B to RT, Beck adds the B to CBT, behaviorists take cognitions and emotions into the fold of behaviors. All this is great and makes sense, and I know that it is very important to find ways to link our subjective mental models to objective maps of the brain and body. Nevertheless, I have often found myself wishing we would reserve “mind” for conscious reasoning and use other constructs for the rest. I am a big fan of Biblical language for different aspects of human subjectivity (breath, heart, soul, etc), and other religious traditions have as much and more to offer.

Reluctantly, I suppose, my current view of the mind is the two-systems theory, more like Haidt’s elephant and rider model, emphasizing the power differential (but not animosity) between the two systems. To the extent that I can I hope to place the “mind” alongside other constructs, as a team player; we are more than our minds.

One “aha” moment from my intro to mental health counseling class this semester was learning to consider mental illness and mental health as different spectra, rather than two ends to a single spectrum. Or, we can leave illness/health on one continuum and add a wellness continuum alongside. This approach is very encouraging for me personally, since it is unlikely I will be able to eliminate depression from my life, and I expect it is helpful to others with chronic conditions. Nonetheless, illness and health are co-defining, pulling on each other and the always shifty idea of “normal” functioning, normal thinking, normal feeling. The notions are instinctual and universal, even though the details vary considerably from culture to culture, context to context. I try to hold the terms lightly, and I hope to use them lightly in practice.

D. Though I have frequently experienced performance anxiety, depression, frustrating struggles with motivation and sleepiness, stormy shame and guilt during my vocational journey, my co-workers over the years have always commented on my laid-back affect, stability, friendliness, and introversion. I like working with teams or on my own. Generally I have not enjoyed running programs or community organizing; or, rather, I enjoyed them somewhat, but I burnt out quickly.

My values come from Christianity, or at least that is how I identify them. The fruits of the Spirit are one of my frequent self-pep talks: love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control. Temperamentally my introversion often stands out, although I can talk my share when I get warmed up. I am a big people-pleaser, non-confrontational, so I have gotten myself into several pickles that way. I will need to be very clear and intentional in setting healthy boundaries with myself, clients, and co-workers. Although I am not super-conversational, I love to hear people talk about their lives, how they exist in the world, and I always have questions or want to know more specifics. I never feel like I have heard it all or have fully sounded the contours of some experience. I am banking on this incessant curiosity about human subjectivity to be a driving force in my practice.

Part IV

A-B. After juggling several possible combinations, I decided to go with an Adlerian and Behavioral combo. My spiritual direction training program leaned heavily on Jung, so I have some good experience working with his constructs, but Adler just seems too perfect of a fit for rehab counseling to pass up. Adler gives me a broad and life-affirming foundation for the eminently practical and applicable behavioral approaches. Farmer Carl is the man, but Adler may have been client-centered before it was cool.

The biggest drawback for Adlerian theory may be the lack of research. The evidence section in the Corsini chapter mentions some promising research relating to a particular lifestyle assessment, however most of the support for Adlerian principles and constructs seems to come from research into other theories or common factors. In the September 2018 issue of the Journal of Individual Psychology dedicated to promoting research into Adlerian therapy, Richard Watts writes that, while Adlerian constructs have some decent research legs, there has been little work done to directly investigate the efficacy of Adlerian therapy.

Behavior therapies, on the other hand, are knocking it out of the park, racking up the “evidence-based” runs. Martin Anthony writes, in the Corsini chapter, “the list of empirically supported psychological treatments [from the APA] includes 80 treatments for particular disorders of which more than three-quarters are behavioral or cognitive-behavioral treatments, and several others include behavioral elements” (224). 

C. As a theory and world-view emphasizing holism, lifestyle, social context, and encouragement, Alderian theory almost seems tailor-made for a rehabilitation setting. Rehab clients have a variety of challenges and goals -- independent living, physical and mental recovery, employment, improving family life and social engagement -- but I am hard pressed to think of a goal Adler would see as beyond his scope of work: “life, work, and love.” What arena of life is beyond the reach of a theory of encouragement? Adler’s attempt to address the whole lifestyle of a person and offer pro-social treatment is reflected in the mission statements for the RSA -- employment, independence, and integration -- and DARS -- independence, inclusion, and integration. Although, as a good socialist, I expect Adler might try to temper our American insistence on independence.

Adlerian theory lines up well with my own values. Adler sat face to face with his clients and actively advocated for social equality. He did not think counseling was only for the “sick,” but could benefit anyone and everyone. He attempted to increase mental health in various settings, rather than only attempting to decrease mental illness. Adlerian theory views mental illness functionally and lightly: Maniacci and Maniacci write in the Corsini chapter, “Psychopathology can be conceptualized (in part) as a matter of ‘goodness of fit’ between the terrain [of a person’s life] and [that person’s] map” (63).

Adlerian theory somewhat supports my criticism that theories of mind tend to overtake all aspects of life. Adler emphasizes the “whole” person, not just the mind. In any case, this theory seems less mind-centric than other theories. On the other hand, Adler may not be too keen on two-systems theory, as it cleanly divides mental life into two types. There is more of a gradient or continuum between conscious and unconscious processes than two-systems theory would say. Kahneman does a wonderful job describing how system 1 and 2 interact, but he does not really explain how they bleed into each other and are a single mind. Or is there a meta-system that governs both?

Behavioral theories especially appeal to my values through their openness and humility. Observe, measure, test. They seem to be the most ready to change and adapt to new knowledge and evidence, and I hope to follow that tradition. It also is a great fit with rehabilitation settings, where time is limited and the goals are varied. A behavioral therapist does not need to interpret a person’s entire life in order to help with a specific goal or problem. “Behavior” is a basic, flexible, and easily understood construct, although, like most basic psychological terms, it gets fuzzier and fuzzier the closer you look at it. I am also excited about the “third wave” behavioral theories and their embrace of mindfulness practices and terms. Breathing-based prayer and “centering prayer” -- a type of contemplative prayer based on the Cloud of Unknowing -- have been lifelines for me in the midst of depression and anxiety.

D. I am trying to limit my constructs to five (I wish I could use the entire hexaflex, but I will only borrow one construct from Hayes). First off is “lifestyle,” a key concept for Adler and one that seems appropriate for a rehab setting. Lifestyle is our way in the world, and it involves things we can and cannot control. It is an expansive concept, and in practice I would not have the time to do a full Adlerian life analysis with clients. However, we could use a more limited assessment tool and keep the lifestyle discussion in the mix.

Adapting Adler’s ideas about power and superiority/inferiority, Maniacci and Maniacci write that “people are motivated to move from a perceived ‘minus situation’ to a perceived ‘plus situation’” (62). This hits the nail on the head and links nicely to Tversky and Kahneman’s “prospect” theory. We are always considering goals, fears, and decisions as gains and losses relative to states, usually our current state. Prospect theory also helps to describe our intense loss aversion, which as a rule of thumb, is about twice as strong as the attraction toward gains.

One construct important to both Adlerian and Behavioral theories is ‘teleology,’ or ‘psychology of use.’ It is helpful to assume that behaviors -- especially recurring behaviors, thoughts, or feelings -- serve a purpose. Behaviors are goal oriented, maintained by the person-environment context, even if the person behaving is not consciously aware of their purpose. This leads me to my fourth construct (a three for one): A-B-C. Antecedent, Behavior, Consequence. And with “consequence” we need the key terms positive/negative ‘reinforcement’ and positive/negative ‘punishment.’

Finally, “acceptance” is my last construct, pulled from Hayes’ hexaflex, where he defines it in opposition to experiential avoidance. I am particularly interested in how rehab clients strike the balance between fighting against or striving to overcome their health conditions and accepting their health conditions. Developing the ability to accept painful feelings and thoughts related to a disability may be key for striking that balance.

E. I see all these constructs interacting in a sequence in my practice. While the client may have pressing and pre-identified goals, if possible I would like to start by stepping back together and looking at the client’s entire lifestyle, how they make their way through their various social and environmental contexts. This will help me to get to know the client better, and collaboratively we may see their goals in a broader context, or we may adapt them in ways that would benefit more than just one area of their life. If they do not have clear goals already, we can use this lifestyle discussion as a springboard to goal setting.

As we discuss the clients goals, I will introduce some of the concepts of prospect theory to help describe how people are motivated, or not, in their decision-making. We are typically trying to move from perceived minus to perceived plus (this ties in nicely with ‘teleology’). If we are moving from plus to a higher plus we may find it gradually harder to stay motivated. If we risk moving from plus to minus we will likely find ourselves really, really motivated to avoid that risk. However, if we feel stuck in the minus, we may take some desperate risks, because, heck, it can’t get any worse (yes it can).

If any of the client’s goals have to do with a recurring “problem” behavior or situation, or if the client is having trouble achieving their goals because of person-environment dynamics, we can move to a discussion of the contextual “teleology” of behavior, and we can use the A-B-C concepts to analyze the behavior or situation. We can also use the concept of reinforcement in the context of the client’s values (Hayes) to discuss ways to make their goals easier to achieve and more fulfilling.

Finally, and throughout the process, we can use the construct of “acceptance” and its opposite, “experiential avoidance,” to encourage psychological balance during the recovery journey. Each person has their own individual sweet spot of balance between resist and accept, and at some level we can do both at the same time. But, I believe the client will need some measure of acceptance of feelings and thoughts related to their disability or health condition in order to stay “flexible” and open to possibilities. Without some acceptance, as Hayes explains, we become psychologically dominated by our need to avoid certain experiences or feelings.

F. This Adlerian-Behavioral combo theory is quite psychoeducational, fairly directive, and very focused on the client’s goals. The main intended outcome would be to help the client realize their goals in living, working, and loving. A lofty goal! But, along the way, I hope clients will find more self-awareness, encouragement, and the kind of balance that is summed up by the serenity prayer. “God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference.”

G. In agreement with known facts: I think a “B,” here, because, while I know prospect theory, the teleological view of behavior, A-B-C analysis, and acceptance have solid research foundations, I am not so sure about the research on lifestyle assessments. Also, Adlerian theory is low on research support, generally speaking.

Testable/Falsifiable: “B” again. All the constructs can be investigated, and the efficacy of the approach can be tested. However, the life-affirming, social equality foundation of the theory is more of a personal or spiritual conviction.

Comprehensive: “A.” Between Adler and Behavioral theory we have a wide world to live in. I tried to maintain this comprehensiveness in my theory for rehab settings, where clients and their goals will be very diverse.

Parsimonious: “D.” Adler has such a broad stroke, and Behavioral theory, while maintaining a distinct center, seems to have no distinct boundaries. My combo-version only uses five key constructs, but prospect theory and the A-B-C’s from ABA carry other constructs in tow. This is not a neat and tidy theory.

Heuristic value: “C.” Adler and Behavioral theories go very well together and can be combined in many ways. I think my combination of prospect theory with ABA language could be a great research lens. But, there is no real “hook” to my theory, no key innovation.

Applied value: “A.” All of my constructs are down-to-earth, ready to use, and well-tested, except perhaps for “lifestyle.” However, I would argue that “lifestyle” is particularly applicable in rehabilitation contexts, where clients are pursuing goals in a variety of life domains. Rehab counseling needs a theory for life, work, and love -- and an Adlerian-Behavioral combo is up to the task.



Monday, November 23, 2020

What is the opposite of bias?

 Introduction

Back in Module 3 of this course, Dr. Hawley gave us a quick, experiential crash course in cognitive bias. With a handful of simple questions, she demonstrated a variety of memory and attentional effects -- primacy and recency effects, self-serving bias, among others, if I remember correctly. Soon a question popped into my head: what is the opposite of bias? Honesty? Objectivity? Rationality? Precise calibration? Fairness? Justice? Does the psychological community have a specific term for whatever isn’t bias or biased?

My initial concern and hunch was that the rhetoric of bias research implicitly supported a western-white-male-serving ideal of rationality. I bet all this talk about bias is just another way to put down the “unenlightened”or brow-beat the “overly-emotional” with the bible of “reason.” Blah blah about our “higher” nature! Whose status is supported by this research? Those who happen to be the ones defining and maintaining what’s “higher.” So on and so forth, such went my thought process. I figured this hunch would be easy to confirm (confirmation bias!), and I had an axe to grind (motivation bias!).

It didn’t take long in my reading to realize that I was way in over my head, that bias is a very rich term with lots of contrast, and that I really enjoyed this bias research stuff - to the extent that I could understand what I was reading! I temporarily suspended my confirmation search and decided to use my initial question -- what is the opposite of bias -- in a less pointed way. My attempt in this paper is to use the gestalt idea of a figure against a ground to discuss the way “bias” is used in my small sampling of psychological literature. The three overlapping grounds I present are history, rationality, and fairness, and I conclude with reflections for the  counseling setting.


Who’s to blame for bias? The 1970’s or Bowling?

What if Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman had titled their famous 1974 paper, “Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and skew” (Kahneman 2011)? Or, “imbalance,” or “partiality,” or “common errors?” Would psychology be as biased toward ‘bias’ as it is now? Perhaps bias would still be important in psychological vocabulary, but its use would be more specific to methodological research errors rather than cognitive effects generally; perhaps it would not be quite the catch-all term that it seems to be. However, in hindsight (bias), it is hard to imagine any other word so nicely covering the phenomena Tversky and Kahneman describe in their paper: representativeness, availability, and anchoring. By many accounts this paper was the flag bearer in the vanguard of an army of bias papers (Welsh 2018; Krueger, Funder 2004; Lilienfeld, Ammirati, Landfield 2009). If you are looking for someone to blame -- and I am -- Kahneman is a nice target. But how about the zeit and its geist...

David Chavalarias and John Ionnidis, in their mind-boggling paper mapping 235 biases mentioned in the PubMed database, present a handy list of the 40 most commonly mentioned biases (Chavalarias, Ioannidis 2010). Of those 40, 19 were first mentioned in the 1970’s, compared to only 8 in the 40’s, 50’s, and 60’s combined. Unfortunately, I’ve failed to find a similar word-search-study or usage-history of bias specific to psychological literature. Surely someone, somewhere has written a history of bias research.

On catalogofbias.org, a project of the Center for Evidenced-Based Medicine at Oxford, Jeff Aronson has several wonderful blog posts on the word and its various definitions. He cites David Sackett in 1979 as the first to publish a categorization of biases, and he notes that Sackett drew on the definition laid out in E.A. Murphy’s The Logic of Medicine, 1976 (Aronson 2018). 

Joachim Kreuger and David Funder, in their 2004 call for a “more balanced social psychology,” see the 1970’s as the beginning of their field’s cognitive shift, specifically a shift toward studying bias in social perception and judgment (Kreuger, Funder 2004). Scott Lilienfeld, Rachel Ammirati, and Kristin Landfield do not define the “modern” time period, but claim the research into cognitive fallibility as one of modern psychology’s “crowning achievements” (Lilienfeld, Ammirati, Landfield 2009).

All this to say: the bias kudzu seems to have first flowered in the 1970’s, and ever since the academic environment has provided fertile soil for its spread. Particularly good fertilizer has been the increased statistical sophistication in psychology and the social sciences. Bias has been a key term in statistics longer than in psychology. In Aronson’s blog his earliest cited technical definition of the term is from a 1926 paper on probability theory (Aronson 2018). Kahneman and Tversky’s initial research question was, “are people intuitively good statisticians?” Another factor involved in a bias toward statistical terminology in psychology could be a shift toward more computational metaphors for the mind and away from literary-humanistic language.

Of course, bias has non-statistical usage as well, which preceded and informed game and probability theories. Pragya Agarwal, in the introduction to her new book Sway: Unravelling Unconscious Bias, provides an overview of the history of the word, beginning with its hypothetical Indo-European root “sker-,” to turn or bend, and continuing in that tradition with 13th century French and Greek words meaning “at an angle or crosswise” and “to cut crosswise,” respectively (Agarwal 2020, p 11-12). In 16th century English the word appears meaning “an oblique or slanting line” and begins to be used to refer to bowling balls weighted unequally to one side, which produced curved trajectories when bowled (Agarwal 2020). Shakespeare uses the word both literally and metaphorically (Agarwal 2020). 

In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman often uses this language of weight (verb) -- to overweight, to underweight -- to explain or substitute for the word bias (Kahneman 2011). In this sense, bias is the tendency to or result of over/under-weighting, or over/under-valuing, or over/under-attending to something, relative to some ideal of balance, value, or objectivity. Before beginning this research I would have defined bias as a diminishment of objectivity because of prior commitments or allegiance, more in line with what might be called “motivation bias.” In other words, I would have said, bias is the skewing effect a committed belief, association, or goal has on arguments or perspectives. If we overlay the pointed, statistically informed use of bias onto the long, glorious tradition of admitting to or accusing others of using loaded bowling balls (metaphorically speaking), then we have a word with a lot going for it! 

What do these two general historical grounds - modern psychology and the tradition of argument/debate - suggest as contrasting backdrops for bias? In statistical psychology, I am guessing (I am statistically uneducated) it would be calibration and validity. Kahneman defines bias as a “systematic error,” so it is a reliable effect, just not valid (Kahneman 2011). In the colloquial-argumentative sense, I think objectivity and fairness capture the anti-bias spirit. All those terms, especially the first three - calibration, validity, and objectivity - hover closely to the idea of “rationality.”


Rational and irrational monsters

Matthew Welsh, in his field guide to bias, cites a 1996 paper by Gigerenzer and Goldstein, in which they argue that in a real world situation, with so many variables and possibilities, people would have to have the mental abilities of a “Laplacian demon” to follow the rules of rational behavior set out by economists (Welsh 2018). Laplace was a French mathematician who helped develop probability and statistics. A less frightening cousin of the Laplacian demon is the “homo economicus,” the fully rational “man.” Welsh and Kahneman enjoy poking fun at this “homo economicus,” while simultaneously promoting the benefits of his decision making abilities. Kahneman’s favorite nickname for him is Robert Thaler’s term, “Econ” (Kahneman 2011).

There are plenty of irrational monsters as well, many more than of the rational type. Lilienfeld, et. al., consider the demon of “ideological extremism” in their paper “Giving Debiasing Away,” and they propose confirmation bias as its main source of power (Lilienfeld, et. al., 2009). Jan De Houwer suspects that “implicit bias” is a threatening construct because it is conceptualized as an “unobservable structure” or “hidden force”  in the mind; he recommends taming this monster by framing implicit bias as a behavior (Houwer, 2019). Krueger and Funder, citing Dawes (1976), explain that, traditionally, “capricious emotional” monsters have been the main threat to rationality; modern psychology, however, has identified the monster within the conscious mind itself (Krueger, Funder 2004). The irrational monsters have breached the walls!

Most of the authors I have encountered see bias as irrational by force of definition. Rationality functions as a strong contrasting backdrop for bias. However, at the same time, these authors also see bias as incorporated into some kind of long-view rationality that, while it may not be rational in a specific instance, is rational because it leads to health or has led to evolutionary fitness. Megan Hughes, et. al., in the Handbook of Applied Cognition, write that, “It appears that some level of positive cognitive distortion is present in healthy individuals and may lead to improved functioning, health, and happiness” (Hughes, et. al., 2007, p 649). In the same vein Lisa Bortolotti and Magdalena Antrobus compare recent studies on “depressive realism” -- which show that people with depressed mood answer certain types of questions more realistically and accurately than average -- and studies on unrealistic optimism -- which show that overconfidence or unrealistically optimistic views are prevalent in nonclinical populations (Bortolotti, Antrobus, 2015). In certain circumstances, irrational confidence or optimistic bias may be more beneficial than clear, “rational” judgment, in which case it may be more “rational” not to listen to your inner Econ.

Another way to put this is that irrational beliefs may lead to, or have led to, rational behavior. This is the tack taken by James Marshall, et. al., in their paper analyzing two different evolutionary theories of cognitive bias (Marshall, et. al. 2013). They distinguish the ability to rationally assess a situation from the ability to rationally behave in that same situation; and these two abilities are not perfectly correlated. Dominic Johnson, et. al., explain this dynamic well using Error Management Theory (Dominic Johnson, et. al., 2013). Cognitive biases may not “maximize expected payoffs” of food or other goods, but they have maximized Darwinian fitness by helping us avoid very costly errors across a lifespan. Johnson, et. al., use the “smoke alarm analogy,” as does Agarwal, to explain how asymmetric costs of false positives and false negatives can encourage bias. Technological limits of smoke detectors mean that they can make mistakes, and falsely detecting smoke (annoyance) is less costly than falsely not-detecting smoke (house burns down). Therefore, engineers work harder to avoid false negatives than false positives.

According to Lilienfeld, et. al., the psychological community generally agrees that cognitive biases are “basically adaptive processes” (Lilienfeld, et. al., 2009). The next question is whether or not they will continue to lead to rational behavior in our current context or future contexts. Everyone seems to be clear that bias leads to specific irrational understandings and decisions, but can we comment on their current or future long-view-rationality? Are they still adaptive in a broad sense, and how could we possibly answer that question? Adaptive may be a word best reserved for highsight. Plus, we seem to have the ability to recognize bias in each other and mitigate it socially. How and why did that evolve? Plus, with all these biases front and center in my mind (availability bias), it is hard for me to conceptualize a “rational” cognitive process; it is easier to think of interacting biases, facilitating or inhibiting each other. This is a rabbit hole! 


A bad feeling about bias

Overlapping and undergirding the bias/rationality discussion is the bias/fairness discussion. The most sobering parts of Agarwal and Kahneman’s books are their examples of bias in the judicial system. Kahneman mentions a study of the anchoring effect on German judges who simply rolled a die loaded to 3 or 9 before estimating jail time for a specific case (Kahneman 2011, p 125-126). For judges who rolled the 3, the average jail-sentence estimate was 5 months. For those who rolled the 9, the average estimate was 8 months. In her chapter on biases built into technology, Argarwal mentions a risk assessment algorithm used in many state courts to predict reoffending rates and “inform decisions about who can be set free at what stage of the criminal justice system” (Agarwal 2020, p 378). A 2017 ProPublica report exposed the algorithm as unreliable and extremely biased against black defendants “even when controlling for prior crimes, actual future reoffending, age and gender” (Agarwal 2020, p 379).

Agarwal’s discussion of unconscious bias packs a direct moral punch because she relates biases to social inequalities and injustice. But, even the less morally potent decision-making-theory context of Welsh contains a social justice/fairness backdrop. He describes how biases have led to unfair hiring practices in academia, and he is particularly interested in how bias functions in the spread and maintenance of socially harmful “factoids,” like the link between the MMR vaccine and autism (Welsh 2018). The way Kahneman frequently describes bias as over/under-weighting itself suggests the scales of justice and fairness. It is hard to say “bias” without evoking some unfairness connotations or generally negative feelings.

This is in part the basis for De Houwer’s argument that implicit bias should be framed as “implicit group based behavior” rather than as a “latent mental construct” (De Houwer 2019). If bias is something bad or unfair, and if it is something we have hidden inside us, then, “Being told that we are implicitly biased can threaten core beliefs about who we think we are and aspire to be” (De Houwer 2019). Being told I am bad feels quite different from being told I have behaved badly in specific instances. Agarwal makes a similar argument regarding the use and interpretation of the Implicit Association Test. Because it has been difficult to correlate test results with specific biased behaviors, she cautions against using the test to say anything conclusive about an individual person, to label them biased or unbiased (Agarwal 2020). While Agarwal does not refrain from trying to investigate implicit beliefs and associations, she is ultimately concerned with debiasing behavior.


Conclusion

What is the opposite of bias? And does that have anything to do with mental health counseling?

While the word bias has no distinct opposite, it does have a rich meaning with lots of contrast. The two strongest contrasting backdrops may be rationality -- accurate, objective, goal oriented thinking and decision making -- and fairness, with an emphasis on social justice. The word also has a rich history, from bowling to bell-bottomed wearing 70’s psych professors and beyond. Today the word has a “buzz” quality to it; as Agarwal says, “there is a real danger of unconscious bias being reduced to a ‘trend’ or ‘fluff word’” (Agarwal 2020, p 11). At the same time its negative edge may be sharper now than when it first established itself in the psychological literature.

It is an important word in the world of cognitive therapies, and it is also common in the political and social rhetoric of today. There is a good chance that therapists and clients will discuss bias, and therapists might want to 1) consider beforehand how they will frame the word, and 2) give time to the client to reflect on the term and how it makes them feel and think. 

What backdrop does the therapist use? What backdrop does the client use? For example, let us say that a therapist wants to briefly describe negativity bias to a client with depression. The therapist may be thinking of this bias simply as an unhelpful tendency at this particular moment for this particular person; the therapist may not want to imply anything about their client’s rationality, objectivity, fairness, et cetera. However, the client may see this bias as a negative part of their character, or as a failure of their intelligence (negativity bias!).

Also, therapists may be involved in psychoeducational efforts to reduce prejudice and discrimination and increase inclusion and justice. In these contexts bias will likely be used frequently. Again it may be helpful for the therapist to examine how they intend to use and frame the word. “What is the opposite of bias?” could be a fruitful question for implicit bias or unconscious bias workshops. Bias is such an interesting and attention-catching subject (negativity bias?), it can be easy to lose sight of the end goal of most implicit bias workshops: increasing inclusion and justice. To achieve that end we probably need as much or more broaden-and-build-inclusion work as we need diagnose-and-debias work.

References


Agarwal, Pragya (2020). Sway: Unraveling Unconscious Bias. Bloomsbury Sigma.


Aronson, Jeff (2018). A Word About Evidence: 4. Bias - etymology and usage [Blog post].

https://catalogofbias.org/2018/04/10/a-word-about-evidence-4-bias-etymology-and-usag/


Aronson, Jeff (2018). A Word About Evidence: 5. Bias - previous definitions [Blog post].

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Friday, November 13, 2020

Bias in Science and Communication

 Bias in Science and Communication: A Field Guide - Matthew Welsh

chp 1 - quiz

chp 2 - anchors aweigh

- decision making theories springing from probability theory, game theory, mathematicians trying to help maximize decisions in games/gambling

-Laplace - "common sense reduced to calculus", expected value (value of outcomes multiplied by likelihood)

-Nocolas and Daniel Bernoulli, St Petersburg Paradox

-homo economicus, rules for rational decision making (Von Neumann and Morgenstern), transitivity (A>B and B>C, means A>C), independence (preferences don't change), completeness

-Herbert Simon, bounded rationality, scissors metaphor, cognitive abilities and structure of world (how much info is readily available)

-Tversky and Kahneman - heuristics and biases

-two systems theory

    -Stanovich and West - system 1 as TASS (the autonomous set of systems)

    -metacognitive process of switching systems, error recognition, etc?

chp 3 - on message: reasons for and types of communication

-cognitive biases vs motivational biases

-implicit vs explicit bias

-elicitation of uncertainty

-wisdom of crowds effect (Galton) - have to be independent

chp 4 - Improbable interpretations: misunderstanding statistics and probability

-risk - multiple definitions, 1- probability of negative outcome, 2- product of likelihood and magnitude, 3 - dangerous and uncertain behavior/event

-variability - measurements of same parameter vary

-uncertainty - multiple definitions, 1 unable to measure, 2 - not knowing whether true or not

    -common error is for people to assume that past variability is an adequate measure of possible future values, use variability as measure of uncertainty

-monty hall problem, Let's Make a Deal, Marilyn vos Savant, many people responded angrily to her

-common problems in probability

    -sample size invariance

    -base rate neglect

chp 5 - truth seeking? biases in search strategies

-how search for info and update beliefs

-Laplacian demon, so many options and parameters

-"secretary problem"...an optimal stopping problem

-Simon - satisficing (when optimisation is too demanding)

-Naturalistic decision making (Klein and Zsambok) study how experts make decisions

-recognition and other selection heuristics

    -confirmation bias, confirming rather than testing

Chp 6 - same but different: unexpected effects of format changes

- people interpret percentages and natural frequencies differently

    -base rate neglect

    -twice as bad, etc (when risks are super low)

-nudge (default decisions, organ donors in europe)

-framing effects

-prospect theory: gains and losses, loss aversion

-order effects

    -primacy effect (remember first items, anchoring?)

    -recency effect - remember more recent items

-comparisons and preferences - single evaluation vs joint evaluation

Chp 7 - I'm confident, you're biased: accuracy and calibration of predictions

-positive correlations in confidence across fields of activity (higher level of competence or trait of confidence?)

-can someone accurately recognize whether the confidence they feel is justified or not? no

-Dunning-Kreuger effect (ignorant of ignorance)

-hard-easy effect - overconfident in hard questions, underconfident in easy questions

-three different forms of overconfidence

    -overplacement (more than 80% rate themselves above the median)

    -overprecision (predict too precisely, especially experts)

    -overestimation (overestimate the likelihood of getting things right)

-underestimate uncertainty!!!!

-planning fallacy

-reducing overconfidence, awareness helps but not solves problem

    -format, process changes (elicitation tools)

    -taking the outside view (use data from other similar situations)

Chp 8. - sub-total recall: nature of memory processes, their limitations and resultant biases

-long-term vs short-term memory

-forgetting

-availability bias, strong even when probability described, planing fallacy

-faulty trees (unpacking effect); hard to account for implicit categories (unavailable) - probability predictions change when you unpack the categories

-anchoring searches, still strong even after been explained

    -break dependence on a single anchoring value

-hindsight bias, causal explanations, once formed, difficult to imagine things having turned out differently, or etc, changing hypotheses

Chp 9 - Angels and demons: biases from categorization and fluency

-heightism

-halo effect

-pretty/good

-Matthew effect

-stereotypical thinking

    -fuzzy boundaries

    -probabilistic membership, predictive power

    -making predictions with limited info

        -combination of stereotypes, halo effect, confirmation bias - view a group as good or bad

        -implicit bias

            -"people are faster at completing a categorisation task with items that are stereotypically related, and slower with less stereotypically related

-Groupthink

-Easy to believe: fluency leads to believability, less likely to be checked

Chp 10 - us and them: scientists vs lay-people and individual differences in decision bias

-situational awareness developed by certain experts in certain fields (regular feedback, regular environment)

    -meteorologists: good calibration

-intelligence only weakly correlated to bias susceptibility, how about personality? (big 5)

-high conscientiousness more susceptible to hindsight bias

-cognitive reflection test

-"need for cognition" (NFC)

    -less prone to system one biases (stereotyping and halo effect)

    -more prone to system 2 biases (hindsight, confirmation bias)

Chp 11 - Warp and weft: publication bias example to weave it all together

-publication bias - tendency to decide whether to pursue publication based on what was found and how interesting, far more likely to pursue publication with positive results

    -bias toward novelty, toward confirmation, less replication

    -HARKing effect - hypothesising after results are known (works its way into papers)

    -too much dependence on small sample sizes

    -less re-test and replication

    -editorial decisions, who the author is, who you know, gender bias,

Chp 12 - Felicitous elicitation: reducing biases through better elicitation processes

    -outside view, calculate, transparency, decision making procedures, elicitation toles (MOLE, more or less elicitation - better and prefer making relative judgments, reduce anchoring effect, wisdom of crowds effect)

Chp 13 - A river in Egypt: denial, scepticism, and debunking false beliefs

    -gullibility: makes sense socially and evoluntionarily, have to learn a lot of info, makes sense to trust others

    -echo: more often factoid repeated

    -trust, trust the messenger first, then the messenger

Chp 14 - spotters guide to bias

Wednesday, November 11, 2020

Sway

 Sway: Unravelling Unconscious Bias - Pragya Agarwal


Intro

- 13th c french, biais - at an angle or crosswise

- english 16th c, oblique or slanting line, bowling balls that were weighted on one side

Chp 1 Gut Instinct

- Antoine Bechara, USC, studying people w/ brain damage not able to use intuitions, decision making very difficult and time consuming

- satisficing

- Herbert Simon: scissors metaphor: one blade task environment and other blade computation capabilities (context and cognition)

- inattentional blindness - lack of attention b/c focused on something else

- cognitive illusion - unconscious inferences

- conformity: informational, normative, internalized

- confirmation bias

- default bias

- association and affiliation, category membership, in-group/out-group

Chp 2 - dawn of time

- affordances - what the environment offers the individual

- out-group bias stronger than in-group favoritism

- more reliance on cognitive shortcuts when uncertain

- smoke alarm analogy

- three theories of how implicit biases formed

    - heuristics, shortcuts, kahneman and tversky

    - error management theory (haselton and buss), judgments about opportunities and threats consistently deviate toward extreme response; in case of threat, false negative highly costly, while false positive not that costly

        - propensity for false negatives may be root

    - artefact theory, biases are product of applying wrong strategy in wrong context, these are artefacts of hunter-gatherer days, etc

- easier to process hierarchical relationships more fluently than egalitarian

- implicit egotism theory - favor objects that they associate with self

- name-letter effect (Jozef Nuttin) - tendency to like appearance of first letter in name

- normative determinism, aptronym, name-is-fitting bias

Chp 3 - all in your head

- us vs them

-study of kids with Williams Syndrome (tend to be friendly and have less fear of others

-damaged amygdala, less likely to do risk assessments, more likely to trust and approach

-parochial altruism - more likely to help ingroup

-different brain patters when reacting to ingroup member in pain vs outgroup member

-more regret from negative result of non-default actions as opposed to routine actions

-default bias

-negativity bias - react more strongly and remember negative info

    -negative info processed more quickly

-truth bias - more likely to believe statements as truthful compared to actual

-people are better at recognising own race faces and own-gender faces

-halo effect and horn effect

-different process for people (global) vs object (local) recognition; women more often perceived as objects

    -objectification theory

-stereotype threat - fear of being stereotyped, impairs performance, increased anxiety, etc

-social fear not necessary for gender stereotypes but impt for racial stereotypes

-frequent contact, exposure may decrease salience of racial stereotypes

-accent bias

-affective processing theory - positive bias exhibited toward others who speak with own accent

-partisan bias

-reflective system (2) vs reflexive system (1)

Chp 4 - back in your box

-constantly assigning people membership

-more likely to rely on stereotypes when cognitive load is high

-kernel of truth hypothesis

-stereotype endorsement, activation, categorisation, application

-out-group homogeneity effect - tendency to see out-group members as more alike than in-group

    -even in gender stereotypes, so exposure not necessarily issue

-higher in the hierarchy more likely to stereotype lower

-Patricia Devine, UW-Madison

-more likely to remember info that confirms our stereotypes

-intersectional invisibility model - less likely to recognize people with multiple identities as full members of groups

-"Indianness is a national heritage...everyone owns them...right to use Indians"

-perpetual foreigner

-Bhabha and Chow - stereotypes work through repetition and ambivalence, easily shifting b/w contradictory meanings

-positive stereotypes - create competition and division between groups

    -create misconception that negative stereotypes have been neutralized

    -tend to lead to stronger negative stereotypes

    -tend to be prescriptive

-Double-bind bias

-stereotype lift - improve performance based on denigration of out-group

-stereotype boost - improved performance based on activation of positive stereotypes

-resume of a mother rated less competent than father

-self-objectification theory - women and girls internalize sexual objectificationa

Chp 5 - Bobbsey Twins

-confirmation bias

-Schelling segregation model, or tipping model

    - small preferences lead to large effects (segregation)

-disconfirmation bias (denigrating arguments counter to our own)

-social contagion theory

-more likely to act on biases and prejudices when surrounded by others with same

-social media fostering homophilic environments / echo chamber

-filter bubble (Pariser)

-availability cascade

-position bias (pay more attention to things at beginning and end)

-frequency bias (Baader-Meinhof phenomenon)

-association of nationality and social category membership

-threat and fear: more deference to authority, aggression toward out-group, more rigid hierarchical view of world

-political parties more identity than policy

-partisan political bias based on morality, more socially acceptable to be biased/prejudiced, etc.

-representation and role-models

Chp 6 - Hindsight is 20/20

-present bias, procrastination, delayed gratification with a hyperbolic curve

-loss aversion bias

-endowment effect

-choice can be demotivating

-familiarity bias, mere exposure effect

-evaluation of trustworthiness precedes eval of competence

-happpiness makes novelty attractive, saddness prefers familiarity

-accumulated advantage - high status evaluated more positively

    -the Matthew effect (rich get richer, poor get poorer)

    -higher status pitchers getting more calls

    -halo effect

    -hindsight bias, false memory, recall bias

        -believe that it appeared more likely after the fact

        -Roese and Vohs (memory distortion, inevitability, foreseeability): myopic attention to a single causal understanding of the past (to the neglect of other reasonable explanations) as well as general overconfidence in the certainty of one's judgments')

-hindsight bias greater when outcome negative

-just deserts bias

-conjunction fallacy, also have inherent bias that detailed statements more likely than general ones

-narrative fallacy

Chp 7 - Sugar and Spice

-gender stereotypes formed very early on

-binary bias, cultural or biological, or both?

-solve stereotype inconsistent riddles with more difficulty

-male-firstness bias

-linguistic determinism

-"she" only once in hobbit!

-very minor differences in number of words boys and girls speak

-women speak less than men in mixed groups, interrupted more

    -interruptions associated with dominance

-ambivalent sexism, positive stereotypes

-implicit sexist bias in women as well as men

-more ingroup difference in spacial abilities than between group

-creeping determinism, connecting the dots

-women in e.r. less likely to be taken seriously or given same amount of pain med

-most trials carried out on male mice or human males

Chp 8 - It's not black and white

-2015 guardian study - 102 people of 464 killed by police unarmed, black Americans twice as likely to be unarmed while killed

-black people way more likely to be arrested for drug crimes despite similar rates of use

-study of when to shoot/not shoot in video game setting, different results black vs white priming info

-implicit bias in language of judicial process

-young boys of color perceived as older and less innocent

-black patients receive less pain medication

-minority ethnic maternal mortality rates increased in us 2000-2014

-"snow capping" organization white at top and black at bottom

-Claire Jean Kim - racial triangulation theory

-model minorities

-colourism, especially prominent at intersection of race and gender

-using white actresses to calibrate lighting, color, contrast in media, "Shirley card"

-aversive racism (?)

-imposter syndrome

-those who believe they are not racist or sexist more likely to show implicit bias

-hypodescent rule - designated the status of subordinate group in lineage

Chp 9 - Swipe right for a match

-beauty bias, halo and horn effects

-physical attribute stereotypes

-associate of attractiveness and intelligence

-mate choice theory

-attractiveness a perpetual anchor

-effects of attractiveness on infant gaze/attention

-faces evoke trust

-man can be competent but not likeable, women need to be likeable to be competent

-weight bias, size and shape bias, weight discrimination, more socially acceptable

-internalized negativity, shame, bias

-heightism, verticality and power

-ageism, harder on women

-assign positive or negative evaluation of a cue within seconds

-metaphors we live by

-out-group favoritism (old favoring young)

Chp 10 - I hear you, I say

-besides faces, often react to accents first

-voice like a second signature, linguistic first impressions

-language association with nationality starts earlier than race

-villains with foreign accents

-trust and belief

-standard language ideology, native-speakerism

-associated with education, honesty, intelligence, criminality

-linguistic accommodation, chameleon effect, convergence or divergence

-code-switching, bi- or multi-dialecticism

-gender stereotypes and voice

-names playing into racism, sexism, ethnocentrism (familiarity and name bias)

-ease of name pronuciation

Chp 11 - I'd blush if I could

-technology often being developed by and for white men (tested mostly on whites and men)

    -voice recognition, facial recognition, virtual reality games

    -algorithms, trained on biased data sets, or data sets not representative of population

    -risk assessments, medical assessments

    -default settings for cameras, media equipment, set up for whites or lighter skin tones

    -Joy Buolamwini, Algorithmic Justice League, the "coded gaze"

Chp 12 - Good intentions

-diversity does not equate to inclusivity or equality or equal opportunity

-some criticisms of the IAT

    -hard to show connection between IAT scores and specific behaviors

    -doesn't show test-re-test reliability

    -hard to prove that it's measuring implicit biases

Epilogue - De-biasing 101

-taking more time

-awareness

-criticize behavior rather than person

-reduce essentialist tendencies and stereotypes

-name and gender blind reviewing (technique)